


# Exhibit A



**From:** Bill Weinreb [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Tuesday, September 29, 2020 5:30 PM  
**To:** Beck, Amanda (USAMA) [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** Casey, Jason (USAMA) [REDACTED]; Harrah, Craig A [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: US v. Yu: Short conversation with 2 ADI employees


Amanda –

ADI's logs do indicate that it transferred a mask set to Win on or about February 4, 2015, that contained 11 different designs, including designs provided by Yu. One of the designs was the HMC8257, which had an ECCN of 3A001.b.2.c. Peter Katzin was the Director of Engineering and Export Control expert at the time. It is possible that Katzin approved Yu to do the actual file transfer to Win. ADI is confident that it had the necessary export licenses for the transfer.


As a general matter, ADI had in 2015, and continues to have, very strict export control policies and procedures. It maintains a manufacturing license with Win and for many other suppliers, customers, and employees (for deemed exports). Only ADI's Export Compliance team is authorized to make export decisions.

I hope this is helpful.

Bill



YU-004045



**From:** Bill Weinreb [REDACTED]  
**Sent:** Friday, September 25, 2020 4:57 PM  
**To:** Beck, Amanda (USAMA) [REDACTED]  
**Cc:** Casey, Jason (USAMA) [REDACTED]; Harrah, Craig A [REDACTED]  
**Subject:** RE: US v. Yu: Short conversation with 2 ADI employees

Amanda –


We focused on that date range assuming the tapeout Yu claims was authorized is the one he did in April 2017 that resulted in the wafers Bob examined in October 2019 (i.e. the ones that are the subject of the indictment). If Yu contends that tapeout was a sanctioned ADI activity, that claim can easily be refuted.

Yu did participate in tapeouts to WIN during his time at ADI, and some of his designs would have been included in those tapeouts, but none of those tapeouts could have resulted in the wafers that were taken in evidence at his arrest.

Yu never would have been cleared to transmit data to Win himself, as there is a specific process required in order to protect ADI's IP, ensure compliance with Export Control regulations, and ensure proper billing.

If you can provide more detail on what you are looking for that would enable ADI to do a more targeted search, I can see if that is possible.

Thanks, Bill



On Sep 25, 2020, at 1:13 PM, Bill Weinreb [REDACTED] wrote:

Amanda,

ADI searched for any record of a tapeout of process 0.15W2MPH.0D\_PW (i.e. Yu's process) during March 2017 to May 2017. If there had been a tapeout of that process during that period, ADI would have a record of it. ADI has been unable to locate any record of such a tapeout, let alone one done with anyone's permission.

[REDACTED]

Regards,

Bill

[REDACTED]